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I
INTRODUCTION
The phrase "law and economics"' has both descriptive and prescriptive
aspects. Sometimes it is used by those who seek to describe the law by
claiming that the common law's major goal is "economic efficiency." Others
use it to prescribe, urging judges to create or uphold rules of law which
increase wealth, or asking judges to rely more heavily on economics in writing
opinions. Professor Cooter's article focuses on the descriptive element;Judge
Wald's article focuses on the prescriptive. I shall make a few comments about
each and suggest that economics ought to play a real but limited role in
judicial decisions. I will begin my comments with an examination of Professor
Cooter's arguments. 2
II
THE DESCRIPTIVE ELEMENT OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
Since federal law is primarily statutory, federal judges are rarely expert in
common law fields; I am no exception, and my comments on Professor
Cooter's intelligent, interesting, and provocative paper are, therefore, often
tentative or in the form of questions. I make six comments on Professor
Cooter's article, and these comments can be divided into two parts: (1) I
question whether he has properly captured the notion of liberty, and; (2) as a
judicial consumer of these economic principles, I believe he has misapplied
them to legal questions.
First, Professor Cooter begins by stating that the reasons judges give for
their decisions are complex, and include a desire to achieve such goals as
"equity, fairness, efficiency, clarity, [and] administrability.- 3 Judges are also
influenced, according to Professor Cooter, by such factors as "precedent, and
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morality, to name a few. ' 4 I agree, and I am therefore skeptical of any effort
to reduce this range of reasons to any single reason concrete enough to be
interesting.
Second, the argument that liberty [is] logically more fundamental than
wealth 5 is not convincing. Professor Cooter argues that wealth requires
property and that property rights are an aspect of liberty.6 Yet, similarly,
liberty implies human action, which in turn requires food and clothing, which
in turn assumes some form of material wealth. Alternatively, it is not clear
that legal property rights are more properly viewed as an aspect of liberty7
than as a restraint on liberty; after all, A's right to use a thing implies B's
obligation to let A do so.
Third, what is "conjunctive liberty?" 8 Professor Cooter says it is the sum
of all permitted actions, after each action has been assigned a weight in
accordance with its value. 9 If so, conjunctive liberty is really nothing more
than human good, and it is not surprising that law aims at its maximization; so
too does every reasonable human institution. One would hope, moreover,
that, over time, those rules and precedents which are not conducive to human
well-being would gradually disappear from the law. This statement, however,
is far too abstract to be of interest.
Fourth, Professor Cooter (and others) often refer to the "purpose" or
goal" of the common law.' 0 They cannot mean a legislator's purpose, as
there is no legislator of the common law; nor can they mean the judge's
purpose, for few, if any, judges consciously or unconsciously try to "maximize
wealth" or "maximize liberty" in deciding a typical tort or contract case; nor
can they mean the litigants' purposes, for this same reason. Nor is it
particularly helpful, for present purposes, to present a metaphor which
suggests that a rule-based institution, like the law, is a mythical human being,
like Paul Bunyon, who is trying to achieve a single purpose." I suspect that
by using the word "purpose" they mean to suggest that, over time, those rules
and precedents which do not tend to maximize wealth or liberty disappear
from the law, to be replaced by other rules or precedents which tend to
achieve these goals. Stated this way, might Professor Cooter's thesis be tested
empirically and compared with, say, Judge Posner's? 12
Fifth, I am not persuaded by Professor Cooter's property examples. For
instance, is a damage remedy for an encroaching house more efficient than an
injunctive remedy?' 3 Why would the creation of a damage remedy, allowing
4. Id.
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me to enlarge my view by cutting down your tree and paying you damages,
"maximize wealth?"'14 I do not see how the existence or nonexistence of
either remedy would change the use to which the land, house, or tree are put,
for, as Professor Coase instructs,' 5 the relevant owners will simply bargain to
achieve an efficient result in either case.
Sixth, are there really economists who argue that wealth is maximized
through a rule of tort law which seeks to "[f]ind a sum of money such that the
parents are indifferent between [(1)] having the money and a dead child or
[(2)] not having the money and having their child alive?"' 16 I think an
economist would more likely argue that such a rule does not maximize wealth,
but rather leads to enormous damage awards. Victims, of course, want such
awards after the accident. Such awards increase insurance premiums,
however, and the same victims, viewed as product consumers before the
accident, may be unwilling to pay this higher price for a product which they do
not yet need. They may prefer to have the product at a lower cost, or to self-
insure, even though fully aware of the possibility that they themselves might
turn out to be victims. The damages rule mentioned, insofar as it forces
consumers to buy higher-priced insurance than they want, might
correspondingly force them to forego products they want more. If so, the
rule would be inefficient. Those who call for a greater integration of law and
economics would provide a more valuable service by suggesting to those
interested in law reform that these arguments at least be considered.
In sum, I am not convinced that Professor Cooter proves that the ultimate
purpose of the common law is to "maximize liberty,"' 7 or that Professor
Cooter has completely provided the means whereby judges may pursue such a
goal. If, however, he seeks only to show that "maximizing wealth" is not the
law's only aim, but that common law rules sometimes encourage commercial
transactions, sometimes protect human liberty, and sometimes further other
worthwhile objectives,' 8 I agree. Of this, however, I did not need much
convincing.
III
THE PRESCRIPrIVE ELEMENT OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
Judge Wald's article concerns the prescriptive aspect of law and
economics, that is, the extent to which the judge should learn economic
theory, digest its principles, and reflect them in opinions. She describes her
own view of the subject as "pragmatic," placing herself "somewhere between
those who would resolve all disputes by economic analysis and those who
14. Id.
15. See Coase, supra note 1. But see Cooter, TheCost of Coase, II J. LEGAL STuD. 1, 24-27 (1982).
16. Cooter, supra note 13.
17. Id.
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would confine the beast to its antitrust and regulatory cage."o My own views
are similar, and some of my reasons closely parallel those of Judge Wald. I
would add only the following four comments.
First, economics plays two different kinds of roles in the courtroom. It
directly influences the content of the rules of law in antitrust and economic
regulation. This fact is not surprising for several reasons: the relevant
statutes use terms with economic connotations; 20 the relevant legislative
history is basically consistent with an economic interpretation of the language;
such an interpretation furthers important statutory purposes;21  and
economics provides a desirable certainty of interpretation which alternative
bases for interpretation of these statutes typically lack.
Economics also enters the courtroom because practitioners in antitrust
and economic regulatory fields must prove specific economic facts related to
individual cases; to do so, they must use economic witnesses. This latter
relationship of economics to antitrust law is no different in principle from the
relationship of medicine to tort law, or that of engineering to contract law.
Outside of antitrust and economic regulation, the importance of
economics declines. Of course, the discipline may still provide valuable
insights in other areas of the law, for example, when economics experts testify
in contract disputes or employment discrimination cases. Yet many other
academic disciplines-political theory, statistics, medicine, anthropology,
sociology-also provide valuable insights regarding the "proper" shape of the
law. The range of different fields from which expert testimony is drawn in
typical cases is virtually limitless. 22
My second comment on Judge Wald's article calls into question the
practical value of "economic theory."2 3 I become particularly nervous when
economic theory begins to inform the interpretation of statutes, largely
because most economic theory in this area stems from "interest group
theory." Interest group theory suggests that many statutes, particularly
19. Wald, Limits on the Use of Economic Analysis injudicial Decisionmaking, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1987, at 235.
20. See, e.g., Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (using economic terms like
"monopolize").
21. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADIOX, 50-71 (1978); but see Kaplow, Antitrust, Law &
Economics, and the Courts, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1987, at 206-10.
22. This conclusion reflects, in part, my own experience. I have heard over one thousand cases
and written between two hundred and three hundred opinions; yet, I can think of only a handful of
cases in which "economic knowledge" seemed particularly useful or relevant. That handful,
moreover, with one possible exception, involved antitrust and economic regulation. Indeed, outside
of those fields, I should recommend that bench and bar study statistics before they study economics,
for with the advent of the discrimination case and the toxic tort case, a knowledge of statistics will
likely be indispensable to a judge seeking to evaluate the merits of conflicting evidentiary
submissions. (Important mistakes do occur; consider the newspaper articles which recently told us
that the odds were billions or trillions to one against a double lottery winner turning up, when, in
fact, the odds may have favored the appearance of such a winner. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1986, at
B9, col. 2. Consider, moreover, the relevance of this fact to toxic tort litigation.)
23. See Wald, supra note 19, at 244.
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regulatory statutes, reflect the views of powerful economic groups. 24 Interest
group theory is interesting, but the more important question is whether it is
accurate. In the early 1970's I heard interest group theory used to describe
airline regulation in the following manner:
The airlines know the regulatory structure benefits them, while the beneficiaries of
deregulation are consumers spread out all over the country. Thus a powerful,
organized, knowledgeable interest group opposes an ignorant, disorganized interest
group. Obviously, deregulation is impossible. 2
5
Yet, the airlines were deregulated, 26 indicating that some revision of the
theory is in order.
In fact, airline regulation provides a good example of the inapplicability of
interest group theory. 27 Regulation gave cartel protection to the airlines, and
academics therefore tended to assume (because of Kolko's book on railroad
regulation)28 that the airlines must have been the ones who sought "cartel
protecting" regulation. History reveals, however, that this was not so. The
airlines did not believe they were getting price-fixing protection when the
regulatory net was passed in 1938.29 One has only to read the historical
accounts of the 1938 law 30 to see how special were the circumstances
(involving airline subsidy scandals) leading to its enactment.
The history of airline deregulation suggests that the causes of the early
1970's regulatory cartel were quite complex. To understand the regulatory
problem in the 1960's, one should imagine a highly competitive industry in
terms of structure, one involving pricing among 50,000 city pairs in a cyclical
industry where cost conditions change rapidly as economic conditions change.
How can a regulator ever set prices for such an industry? In fact, the
regulators negotiated prices in complicated ways with the industry. The Air
Transport Association and the regulators would meet, often informally.
Regulation thereby "worked out." It did not leave the consumer too badly
off, even though it inhibited price competition.
24. See, e.g., Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 45-58 (1984). But see Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985) (Sunstein argues that the interest group hypothesis is historically and
morally inappropriate).
25. No one has adopted a version quite as strong as this, but see Posner, Theories of Economic
Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sc. 335 (1974), and Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of
Regulation, 19J. L. & EcON. 211 (1976).
26. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
27. I was general counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure from 1974-1975, and general counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee
from 1979-80. During that service, the Committee considered and passed legislation deregulating
the airlines and trucking industries.
28. G. KULKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916 (1965).
29. Behrman, Civil Aeronautics Board, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 78-86 (W. Jones ed. 1980).
30. See SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 91ST CONG., lST SESS., CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES 200-06
(Comm. Print 1975).
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Then, a consumer advocate brought a law suit, Moss v. C.A.B. 3' The
District of Columbia Circuit, viewing the matter as "back-room dealing," 32
held the negotiation illegal. The Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") responded
with a brilliant procedural idea. It held one very long and complicated set of
hearings, out of which emerged a set of rules. The rules were remarkably fair,
determining prices everywhere, all at once, and nearly automatically. The
rules were perceived as being so fair, in fact, that no lawyer in Washington
understood why in 1975 Senator Kennedy wanted to look at the CAB. They
thought it an excellent organization because it was a fair organization.
Chairman Brown imposed marvelously fair rules, which applied automatically
and left nothing about which to argue. The only problem was that the rules
also produced price cartelization. The fares were high-too high-and no
airline was free to lower its fare. This "perfect cartel," emerging as it did out
of a complex set of circumstances, defies explanation through any interest
group theory.
Does interest group theory purport to argue that because a group was
benefited, that fact alone proves that the group tried to obtain government
help and succeeded? If so, one could thereby make the theory true by
definition. Yet all political action helps some people and withholds help from
others. It is always true that some groups favored the action and others
opposed it. If, then, the theory is either factually suspect or fundamentally
simplistic, how can judges be expected to use it in interpreting statutes?
What, in other words, does interest group theory tell us about what the law
ought to be?
Third, efforts to develop "economic formulae" for application in other
legal fields too often provide a false sense of accuracy, and, at least
sometimes, distract legal attention from more important issues. Consider, for
example, the Supreme Court's famous decision in Matthews v. Eldridge, 3
providing a formula for the calculation of the "process" that the fourteenth
amendment says is "due." There, courts were instructed to weigh the
importance of the private interest that the process is designed to protect (that
is, is it a job or welfare benefits?), together with the additional accuracy
imported by the (claimed additional) procedure, against the governmental
interest in not providing that procedure.
Judge Posner has argued that this formula is an "economic formula," 34 for
it weighs the benefit of the added procedure (which weight represents the
product of the procedure's importance and its accuracy) against the
procedure's cost. Of course, one may wonder whether the only aim of the due
process hearing is accuracy in application of a statutory standard. Leaving
that point aside, however, one can also wonder about the extent to which the
formula helps. That is to say, insofar as one views the formula as an invitation
31. 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
32. Id. at 894.
33. 424 U.S. 319 (1976),
34. See Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.).
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to engage in a form of economic cost-benefit analysis, can courts really apply
it?
To what extent, for example, can a judge determine the true additional
accuracy which more procedures will provide? Will beneficiaries (say,
disabled persons) be able to take advantage of the procedures? Will the
agency simply enact substantive rules (thereby taking issues away from, say, a
hearing examiner), and substitute absolute rule for adjudicatory discretion?
Some claim this is what happened in welfare cases. Will procedural
formalities have any significant effect on the final substantive decisions? It is
argued, for example, that prison discipline more typically involves disputes
about how much to punish, not about what actually happened.
Similarly, how accurately can a court gauge the cost to the government of
providing additional procedure? Does more procedure mean the government
will not try to fire incompetent employees or to remove ineffective drugs from
the market place? Does "due process" mean, for the public housing tenant,
unremovable, noisy, drug-using neighbors in uninhabitable projects? Does
the process expend limited funds and thereby deprive other potential
program recipients?
How can courts determine these questions of "cost" or "benefit"? How
can they weigh costs and benefits, one against the other? Does an effort to do
so distract attention from more workable approaches?
Of course, one might interpret Eldridge as simply directing lower courts to
weigh all the relevant factors. This type of instruction is fairly common, and it
reflects what courts will do, at least sometimes, even without instruction.
Viewed as such, however, Eldridge is not really an invitation to engage in any
form of economic analysis.
Fourth, I am now involved in an important test case of the practical value
of economic analysis in the criminal law. I am a member of the United States
Sentencing Commission, an agency charged by law to fix sentences for all
federal crimes within narrow limits, by offense and by type of offender.3 5 The
law that created the Commission also abolished parole, 36 so the sentences
that we set will in fact be served. Some members of the Commission believe
that sentence type and length should reflect primarily the "just desert" of the
convicted defendant. Others believe that it should reflect to a considerable
degree the desirability of deterrence as determined by an economic theory of
crime. They point to considerable literature discussing the "economic
theory,"3 7 much of which focuses upon sentencing as the instrument of
deterrence. Yet, will it prove possible to translate any of this theory into
practical rules of decision capable of leading to specific sentence lengths? Are
there any empirical studies that will lead, or point the way, to specific sentence
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1) (1982).
36. Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1985).
37. See, e.g., G. BECKER & W. LANDES, ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
(1974).
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length results? At present, I say only that I do not know. In a few months
time, I will, perhaps, have a more informed view.
Although I may have overstated my position, I tend to agree with Judge
Wald. I am certain that economic knowledge helps the judge in antitrust and
regulatory cases. I am skeptical of, but open to, the possibility that it may be
unusually or especially helpful elsewhere. But this special help, except in a
very few instances, has yet to be demonstrated.
